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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
This case involves competing rights over the 
pharmaceutical paroxetine hydrochloride controlled release 
tablets (―paroxetine‖) in generic form.  Defendant/Appellee 
GSK
1
 holds patent and FDA rights to market and sell 
paroxetine for the treatment of depression under the brand 
name Paxil CR.
2
  As part of a 2007 settlement agreement, 
GSK granted Plaintiff/Appellant ―Mylan‖ (jointly and 
severally referring to Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals 
Inc.) certain rights to produce, market, and sell generic 
paroxetine.  Then, in 2010, GSK agreed—as part of an 
unrelated settlement—to begin supplying Defendant/Appellee 
―Apotex‖ (jointly and severally referring to Apotex Inc. and 
Apotex Corp.) with GSK-produced generic paroxetine for 
marketing and sale to downstream customers.  Mylan filed 
suit against GSK and Apotex, claiming the 2010 agreement 
                                              
1
 ―GSK‖ refers collectively to SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., n/k/a GlaxoSmithKline LLC, d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline; 
SmithKline Beecham P.L.C., n/k/a SmithKline Beecham, 
Ltd.; and SmithKline Beecham (Cork) Ltd., successor to SB 
Pharmco Puerto Rico, Inc. 
2
 GSK maintains patent rights under U.S. Patent No. 
7,229,640 (expires July 2016), and is authorized to market 
and sell paroxetine pursuant to FDA-approved New Drug 
Application (―NDA‖) No. 02-0936.  An NDA must provide, 
inter alia, ―a statement of the drug‘s components, scientific 
data showing that the drug is safe and effective, and proposed 
labeling describing the uses for which the drug may be 
marketed.‖  Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012). 
4 
violated its licensing agreement with GSK, which did not 
permit GSK to provide its own form of generic paroxetine to 
another generic drug company—such as Apotex—to be 
marketed and sold in direct competition with Mylan. 
The District Court found that the terms of the GSK-
Mylan agreement were unambiguous, and they did not limit 
to whom GSK was permitted to market and sell its own 
version of generic paroxetine.  It thus held GSK did not 
breach its agreement by agreeing to provide Apotex with 
GSK-produced generic drugs, and granted summary judgment 
against Mylan on all claims.  For the reasons that follow, we 
reverse the Court‘s grant of summary judgment on the 
breach-of-contract cause of action against GSK, and remand 
for the parties to proceed to trial on that claim.  We affirm its 
grant of summary judgment on all other claims.  Because the 
District Court denied GSK‘s motion to strike Mylan‘s expert 
damages report as moot on the basis of its summary judgment 




                                              
3
 The parties have moved to file under seal Volumes III 
through VII of the Joint Appendix and unredacted versions of 
their briefs, as well as to continue impoundment of the 
portions of the certified record filed under seal in the District 
Court.  We are satisfied there is good cause to seal these 
records—i.e., to protect the parties‘ confidential proprietary 
business and competitive interests.  See Littlejohn v. BIC 
Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Nixon v. 
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)); 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070–71 (3d 
Cir. 1984).  Thus, we grant the motions to seal and limit our 
discussion to those underlying facts and evidence already 
disclosed during the litigation and not under seal. 
5 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. GSK-Mylan Patent Settlement & License 
Agreement 
In June 2007, GSK sued Mylan for patent infringement 
after Mylan sought FDA approval to introduce a generic 
version of paroxetine into the market before GSK‘s patent 
had expired.
4
  The parties settled the case shortly thereafter, 
                                              
4
 Once a new pharmaceutical has been approved for 
sale, there are two means by which a generic form of the drug 
may be introduced into the market.  First, a generic company 
can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (―ANDA‖), 
which seeks FDA authorization to produce and sell a generic 
version of an already approved drug product.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j); 21 C.F.R. § 314.92–99.  Second, the brand company 
may produce an ―authorized generic‖ (―AG‖) under its 
approved NDA, which is labeled as generic and sold at a 
lower price than its branded equivalent, to compete with other 
generic products on the market.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(t)(3). 
 An ANDA filer must certify that the generic drug will 
not infringe on any patent covering the pioneer drug.  One 
way it may do this—as was done by Mylan here—is by 
challenging the validity of the relevant patent via a 
―Paragraph IV‖ certification.  See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).  
For a more thorough discussion of the patent obligations with 
respect to generic applicants, see Abbreviated New Drug 
Application Regulations; Patent Exclusivity Provisions, 59 
Fed. Reg. 50,338 (Oct. 3, 1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 314).  See also Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 
2d 30, 32–34 (D.D.C. 2000) (discussing the development of 
6 
signing a Patent License and Settlement Agreement in August 
2007 (―License Agreement‖).  Section II(c) of the License 
Agreement granted Mylan exclusive rights to market and sell 
generic paroxetine for the remaining life of GSK‘s patent 
(i.e., nearly nine years of complete generic exclusivity).  This 
included manufacturing, marketing, and selling Mylan‘s own 
generic paroxetine drug products, as well as sales rights for 
AG paroxetine manufactured by GSK.  Mylan‘s generic 
rights were exclusive ―even [as] to GSK.‖  See J.A. at 51 
(quoting License Agreement, Section II(c)). 
The parties submitted to the Federal Trade 
Commission (―FTC‖) the License Agreement, in accord with 
its terms and as required by federal law.  See Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, Title XI §§ 1112–13, 117 Stat. 
2066, 2461–63 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355).  In response to 
concerns raised by the FTC about the length and absoluteness 
of Mylan‘s exclusive generic rights, the parties amended the 
License Agreement in September 2007 (the ―Second 
Amendment‖; the First Amendment to the License 
Agreement is irrelevant to this opinion).  It provided two 
specific exceptions to the complete generic exclusivity 
provided under the License Agreement.  First, in the 
settlement of subsequent patent litigation with other third-
party companies that had filed ANDAs for generic 
paroxetine, GSK was permitted to grant nonexclusive licenses 
as part of a settlement agreement with those third parties: 
If GSK receives a Third Party Notification and 
GSK initiates an action for patent infringement, 
GSK can enter into a settlement agreement with 
                                                                                                     
generic drug-approval guidelines and ramifications of a 
Paragraph IV certification). 
7 
respect to such action at any time and Mylan 
agrees to waive its exclusivity under Section 
II(c) in order to permit GSK under such 
settlement agreement to grant such Third Party 
a non-exclusive license under the GSK Patents 
to sell Generic Paroxetine Product(s) in the 
dosage form(s) specified in the Third Party‘s 
ANDA . . . . 
J.A. at 51 (quoting Second Amendment, Section II(e) para. a) 
(the so-called ―ANDA Clause‖). 
Second, and more relevant here, GSK (or a GSK 
affiliate) was entitled to market and sell AG paroxetine 
beginning two years after Mylan launched its generic 
products: 
Also, GSK or its Affiliate may commence 
marketing and selling generic paroxetine 
hydrochloride controlled or modified release 
products pursuant to its Paxil® CR NDA 
(―Authorized Generic Products‖) at the end of 
the second year after Mylan launches its 
Generic Paroxetine Products. 
Id. (quoting Second Amendment, Section II(e) para. b) (the 
―Authorized Generic Clause‖). 
The Second Amendment alleviated the FTC‘s exclusivity-
related concerns.  Thereafter, Mylan launched its generic 
paroxetine drug products in May 2008. 
B. GSK-Apotex Antitrust Litigation & Supply 
Agreement 
In May 2010, GSK settled an unrelated antitrust 
lawsuit brought against it by Apotex.  The terms of the 
8 
settlement agreement provided for a $300 million cash 
payment to Apotex; in addition, Apotex was entitled to a 
guaranteed minimum of $180 million to be earned through 
the sale of GSK products (i.e., ―in-kind transfers‖).  During 
negotiations regarding the potential products GSK would 
provide for the in-kind transfers, Apotex became aware that 
Mylan (i) had certain licensing rights with respect to 
paroxetine, for which Mylan paid GSK royalties, and (ii) was 
the only generic paroxetine market participant.  While it 
refused Apotex‘s request for a copy of the License Agreement 
due to confidentiality concerns, GSK did advise Apotex that 
its supply obligation to Mylan ended by June 2010.  See J.A. 
at 8. 
The parties agreed that one of the GSK-supplied 
products from which Apotex would produce sales revenues 
would be AG paroxetine.  Thus, to implement the in-kind 
transfer arrangement, GSK and Apotex subsequently entered 
into an Exclusive Supply & Distribution Agreement for AG 
paroxetine (―S&D Agreement‖).  Id.  Apotex subsequently 
began sales activities for AG paroxetine, which led to the 
filing by Mylan of this lawsuit in September 2010. 
C. District Court Proceedings 
Mylan brought claims against GSK for breach of 
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and against Apotex for tortious interference with and 
inducement to breach a contract.  The crux of Mylan‘s claims 
was that the terms of the amended License Agreement only 
allowed third-party generic companies that had filed their 
own ANDAs to sell generic paroxetine, and that, even after 
Mylan‘s two-year exclusivity period, only GSK was 
permitted to engage in marketing and sales activities for AG 
paroxetine that were directed to downstream customers—e.g., 
―wholesalers, retailers, pharmacy chains, mail order 
9 
pharmacies, pharmacists, hospitals, clinics, and managed 
market companies.‖  See Mylan Br. at 43.  Mylan asserted 
this was consistent with its position during negotiations—that 
to allow otherwise would force it to compete against other 
generic companies that were not required to expend the time 
and resources to secure FDA approval by filing an ANDA.  
Mylan thus argued that GSK violated the License Agreement 
by entering into the S&D Agreement and supplying Apotex—
an intermediary drug company—with GSK-produced AG 




The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of GSK and Apotex.  In doing so, it ruled that the Authorized 
Generic Clause of the Second Amendment was clear and 
unambiguous, thus permitting GSK to market and sell AG 
paroxetine to whomever it wished, including Apotex, after 
Mylan‘s two-year period of generic exclusivity.  Hence the 
Court declined to consider any of the intent evidence 
submitted by the parties, as well as the industry and custom 
evidence offered by Mylan, on the ground that such evidence 
―cannot be used ‗to create an ambiguity where none exists‘ in 
order to preclude summary judgment.‖  Id. at 13 (quoting 
Int’l Union, UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 145 
(3d Cir. 1999)). 
                                              
5
 Apotex undisputedly did not come within the scope of 
the ANDA Clause, as it never prepared an ANDA for generic 
paroxetine, nor was it sued by GSK for infringing patents 
purportedly covering paroxetine.  And with respect to the 
Authorized Generic Clause, Apotex is a ―Third Party‖ and not 
a GSK affiliate as defined by the License Agreement. 
10 
The Court thus held GSK did not violate the License 
Agreement or, in the absence of proof of bad motive, the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Because it 
found no protectable contract right, the Court also held 
Mylan‘s claims against Apotex necessarily failed; this meant 
that GSK and Apotex were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law on all claims brought by Mylan. 
On appeal, Mylan challenges the District Court‘s 
interpretation of the Authorized Generic Clause and its 
consequent grant of summary judgment in favor of (i) GSK 
on Mylan‘s contractual claims, and (ii) Apotex with respect to 







A. Standard of Review 
Our review of the grant or denial of summary 
judgment is plenary, and we ―apply[] the same standard as the 
district court.‖  Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 
                                              
6
 Mylan does not raise on appeal its inducement to 
breach claim against Apotex; thus, the issue is waived.  See, 
e.g., In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003). 
7
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We exercise appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
11 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 
380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007)).  ―Summary judgment is appropriate 
only where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.‖  Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 380 n.6 (quoting 
Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 322 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In a contract interpretation action, summary judgment 
is appropriate only where the contractual language is 
unambiguous—i.e., ―subject to only one reasonable 
interpretation.‖  See Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast 
Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted).  ―If the nonmoving party presents a reasonable 
alternative reading of the contract, then a question of fact as 
to the meaning of the contract exists which can only be 
resolved at trial.‖  Newport Assocs. Dev. Co. v. Travelers 
Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 789, 792 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Tigg 
Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 
1987); Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 605 
F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1979)).  Whether a contract is ambiguous 
is an issue of law subject to plenary review.  Sumitomo Mach. 
Corp. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 81 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce 
Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
Under New Jersey law (which the parties do not 
dispute governs here), courts must always ―consider all of the 
relevant evidence that will assist in determining the intent and 
meaning of the contract‖ when making ambiguity 
determinations.  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 901 A.2d 
341, 346 (N.J. 2006).  ―Evidence of the circumstances is 
always admissible in aid of the interpretation of an integrated 
agreement.  This is so even when the contract on its face is 
free from ambiguity.‖  Sumitomo Mach. Corp., 81 F.3d at 332 
12 
(quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652, 
656 (N.J. 1953)).  In aid of interpretation, courts should 
consider, for example, ―the particular contractual provision, 
an overview of all the terms, the circumstances leading up to 
the formation of the contract, custom, usage, and the 
interpretation placed on the disputed provision by the parties‘ 
conduct.‖  Kearney PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearney, 
405 A.2d 393, 400 (N.J. 1979).  Thus, courts must consider 
all relevant evidence to determine if any ambiguity exists and, 




 B. Breach of Contract 
                                              
8
 Federal law is consistent with this approach.  See, e.g., 
Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 917 F.2d 107, 111 
(3d Cir. 1990) (―‗In making the ambiguity determination, a 
court must consider the words of the agreement, alternative 
meanings suggested by counsel, and extrinsic evidence 
offered in support of those meanings.‘‖ (quoting Kroblin 
Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 101 (3d 
Cir. 1986))); Teamsters Indus. Emps., 989 F.2d at 135 
(instructing that a court construing contract language is not 
permitted ―simply [to] determine whether, from [its] point of 
view, the language is clear[, but instead must] ‗hear the 
proffer of the parties and determine if there [are] objective 
indicia that, from the linguistic reference point of the parties, 
the terms of the contract are susceptible of different 
meanings‘‖ (last alteration in original) (quoting Sheet Metal 
Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Grp., Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1284 
(3d Cir. 1991))). 
 
13 
 The District Court concluded that, as amended, the 
License Agreement did not limit to whom GSK could market 
and sell AG paroxetine after Mylan‘s two-year period of 
generic exclusivity.  Mylan argues there is a reasonable 
alternative interpretation—i.e., that the Authorized Generic 
Clause only allowed GSK to market and sell AG, whereas 
supplying a third-party generic competitor with GSK-
produced AG paroxetine for marketing and sale to 
downstream customers was impermissible—and thus the 
District Court erred in refusing to consider the evidence 
offered in support of this reading.  For the reasons explained 
below, we agree. 
In support of its alternative meaning, Mylan presented 
various forms of intent evidence.
9
  First, it submitted extrinsic 
evidence of the License Agreement‘s negotiations, including 
the parties‘ respective objectives and their actions taken to 
mollify the FTC‘s concerns about Mylan‘s nine-year 
exclusivity pre-Second Amendment.  Mylan also offered 
custom and usage evidence, including expert testimony 
regarding industry understanding of the phrase ―marketing 
and selling.‖10  Mylan pointed as well to rules of contract 
                                              
9
 In light of our decision that determining the meaning 
of the Authorized Generic Clause is an issue properly left to 
the jury, it is not necessary to engage in a protracted review 
and analysis of this evidence.  Accordingly, we provide only 
an abridged discussion here. 
10
 In a specialized and highly technical field, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, trade usage evidence is particularly 
instructive when interpreting the meaning of disputed 
contractual language.  See, e.g., USX Corp. v. Liberty Mutual 
Ins. Co., 444 F.3d 192, 198 n.11 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying 
Pennsylvania law). 
14 
construction—e.g., affording meaning to the use of different 
words (in particular, ―affiliate‖ and ―third party‖) and reading 
provisions in light of other relevant sections of the License 
Agreement (specifically the section regarding the 
consequences of a ―Negative Response‖ from the FTC)—to 
support its interpretation of the Authorized Generic Clause. 
The District Court needed to take into account the 
alternative meaning suggested by Mylan, and the nature of 
the objective evidence offered in support of its suggested 
meaning, to determine whether that extrinsic evidence 
―demonstrate[d] the existence of a latent ambiguity.‖  
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Samuel Rappaport Family 
P’ship v. Meridian Bank, 657 A.2d 17, 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Yet it refused to 
consider the extrinsic evidence submitted by Mylan.  New 
Jersey law, which is expansive as to extrinsic evidence in aid 
of contract interpretation, requires otherwise.  See Conway, 
901 A.2d at 347 (―permit[ting] a broad use of extrinsic 
evidence to achieve the ultimate goal of discovering the intent 
of the parties . . . [and] to uncover the true meaning of 
contractual terms‖).  The District Court was not free to reject 
such evidence on the ground that it found the agreement on its 
                                                                                                     
 Mylan asserts that its industry custom, practice, and 
usage evidence was uncontested.  However, while GSK did 
not offer competing expert evidence on this subject, it did 
produce its own evidence of industry practice with respect to 
placing AG drugs on the market.  To the extent GSK‘s 
evidence is deemed reliable and relevant to the interpretation 
of the License Agreement, it too should be considered by the 
jury. 
15 




This is especially so when the alternative reading of 
the contested language suggested by Mylan was both 
reasonable and supported by objective evidence of the 
parties‘ intentions.  This demonstrates latent ambiguity in the 
contractual language.  Hence summary judgment was not 
appropriate on Mylan‘s breach-of-contract cause of action.  
―The construction of a written contract is usually a legal 
question for the court, but where there is uncertainty, 
ambiguity or the need for parol evidence in aid of 
interpretation, then the doubtful provision should be left to 
the jury.‖  Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 814 A.2d 1108, 1113–14 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  The District Court‘s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of GSK on Mylan‘s breach-of-
contract cause of action is therefore reversed and remanded 
for that claim to proceed to trial.
12
 
                                              
11
 We note that the language quoted by the District Court 
from International Union, UAW v. Skinner Engine Co. about 
―creat[ing] an ambiguity where none exists,‖ 188 F.3d at 145, 
does not apply here.  As an initial matter, that case involved 
the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement under 
Pennsylvania law.  Further, the statement was made in the 
context of rejecting self-serving testimony that contradicted, 
rather than interpreted, facially unambiguous contractual 
language.  Id.  In contrast, Mylan offered various forms of 
objective evidence in support of its reading, and we believe 
this evidence is interpretive rather than contradictory as to the 
License Agreement‘s terms. 
12
 GSK also asserts Mylan failed to prove damages 




C. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing 
The District Court identified two grounds on which 
Mylan‘s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claim failed.  First, to the extent Mylan‘s cause of 
action was based on on its right to preclude third-party 
generic companies from selling AG paroxetine, the Court 
rejected the claim because it had already determined the 
contract language unambiguously did not give Mylan that 
                                                                                                     
GSK‘s damages argument does not establish that it was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the contract claim.  
First, Mylan submitted an expert report on damages it claims 
to have suffered from Apotex‘s sales of AG paroxetine in the 
District Court, which GSK moved to strike on the ground that 
the report relied on documents and opinions that Mylan 
withheld during discovery.  The Court denied the motion as 
moot after finding GSK was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on Mylan‘s contractual claims.  Because that motion 
has not yet been addressed by the District Court, we will not 
speculate on its merits but rather will allow the Court to 
consider it on remand.  Second, GSK suggests several 
alternative factual scenarios that it claims would also have 
generated generic paroxetine market competition and, 
accordingly, the same ―harm‖ to Mylan.  Whether and to 
what degree GSK‘s hypothetical scenarios would have 
affected Mylan‘s profits under the License Agreement—and 
thus its damages from a breach thereof—is a disputed issue of 
material fact to be resolved at trial. 
17 
right.  Given our holding with respect to the contract claim, 
this reasoning is without continuing force. 
The Court also found, however, that Mylan had failed 
to prove that GSK acted with the requisite bad motive or 
intent when entering into the S&D Agreement with Apotex.  
See Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 
(N.J. 2001) (requiring that a party have acted ―with the 
objective of preventing the other party from receiving its 
reasonably expected fruits under the contract‖ to establish a 
breach of the implied covenant).  Mylan retorts that bad 
motive turns on the parties‘ intentions, and thus is a question 
for the jury, citing Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 
1068 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Div. 2002).  However, 
Seidenberg‘s reference to the ―trier of fact‖ was meant to 
illustrate that defining bad faith is ―unrealistic,‖ not to relieve 
a party of its obligation to set out sufficient evidence of bad 
intention—i.e., to demonstrate an issue of material fact—in 
order to survive a motion for summary judgment.  Id. 
(concluding it ―best to entrust the drawing of [the bad faith] 
line to trial judges and juries‖ but admonishing against ―an 
unduly expansive version of bad faith‖). 
While the S&D Agreement arguably frustrated 
expected profits of Mylan from sales of its generic products 
by introducing a direct third-party competitor, it has not 
produced any evidence that GSK entered into that subsequent 
agreement with bad faith or improper motive.  See id.  
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court‘s grant of summary 
judgment on Mylan‘s good faith and fair dealing claim. 
D. Tortious Interference with a Contract 
As to the alleged tortious interference of contract by 
Apotex, the District Court again rested its dismissal of this 
claim on its conclusion that Mylan had no protectable right to 
18 
prevent third parties from selling AG paroxetine after its two-
year period of exclusivity.  With that absence, Mylan failed to 
make the threshold showing of an existing or prospective 
contractual relationship required for a tortious interference 
claim.  See, e.g., Velop, Inc. v. Kaplan, 693 A.2d 917, 926 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (citing Printing Mart-
Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 
1989) (per curiam)).  Given our determination that Mylan 
arguably had a protectable contract right, we cannot conclude 
that was a proper ground to conclude Apotex was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on this claim. 
Summary judgment was nonetheless appropriate here.  
Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
interference with a contractual relationship that is knowing, 
intentional, and wrongful.  See Lightening Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1167 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Fineman v. 
Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 186 (3d Cir.1992); 
Printing Mart-Morristown, 563 A.2d at 37).  Mylan falls 
short of establishing that interference here. 
As an initial matter, the record does not suggest that 
Apotex had knowledge of Mylan‘s asserted contractual right 
to preclude other generic pharmaceutical companies from 
marketing and selling AG paroxetine.  Actual knowledge of 
the contract with which a defendant supposedly interfered is a 
prerequisite to making out a claim for tortious interference.  
Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. i 
(1979) (requiring that an actor ―have knowledge of the 
contract with which he is interfering and of the fact that he is 
interfering with the performance of the contract‖ to incur 
liability).
13
  It is undisputed that Apotex never saw the 
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 New Jersey has adopted the Restatement‘s definition 
of tortious interference with a contract.  See Matrix 
19 
License Agreement, and there is no evidence in the record 
that it knew any specifics with regard to the Agreement‘s 
terms during the S&D negotiations with GSK.  And without 
knowledge of the specific contractual right, Apotex cannot be 
deemed to have intentionally interfered with that right. 
Mylan nonetheless asserts that the knowledge 
requirement was satisfied here based on evidence 
establishing, in effect, willful blindness on the part of Apotex.  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that showing a deliberate 
indifference to the terms of a contract would be sufficient to 
satisfy the first tortious interference element, the record 
merely demonstrates that Apotex understood Mylan had 
licensing rights to sell a generic form of paroxetine.  Mylan 
has not pointed to any evidence indicating Apotex believed 
that Mylan‘s licensing rights were exclusive as to other third-
party sellers or that Apotex‘s resale of AG paroxetine would 
otherwise infringe the Licensing Agreement.  See, e.g., 
DiGiorgio Corp. v. Mendez & Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 
(D.N.J. 2002) (―General knowledge of a business relationship 
is not sufficient; the defendant must have specific knowledge 
of the contract right upon which his actions infringe.‖ (citing 
Matrix Essentials, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 1247)). 
And even if we were to impute knowledge to Apotex, 
Mylan has failed to establish the requisite ―malice‖ to sustain 
this cause of action.  Where the parties to a tortious 
interference claim are business competitors—such as Mylan 
and Apotex—establishing intentional and malicious 
interference requires evidence that ―one competitor 
interfere[d] with another‘s economic advantage through 
conduct which [wa]s fraudulent, dishonest, or illegal.‖  Ideal 
                                                                                                     
Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1237, 
1247 (D.N.J. 1994) (citations omitted).   
20 
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 659 A.2d 
904, 936 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (citations omitted).  
There is no record indication that Apotex secured its S&D 
Agreement with GSK through fraud, dishonesty, or illegal 
conduct of any kind.
14
  Even construed in the most favorable 
light, the evidence was lacking to substantiate Mylan‘s 
tortious interference cause of action, and summary judgment 
was therefore properly granted to Apotex. 
*    *    *    *    * 
We hold that summary judgment was inappropriate as 
to the breach-of-contract claim against GSK; thus we reverse 
and remand for the parties to proceed to trial on that claim.  
We also vacate the denial of GSK‘s motion to strike as moot 
and remand to permit the District Court to consider that 
motion on the merits.  On all other grounds, we affirm the 
Court‘s judgment. 
                                              
14
 A breach alone is insufficient to establish that a third 
party is liable for tortious interference.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 766B cmt. e (explaining that interference 
resulting from a breach of contract does not amount to 
tortious behavior unless it was wrongful, which turns on the 
actor‘s intent to interfere). 
